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economic growth and employment. Good policy
practice can be judged by the outcomes achieved.
Therefore, I would like to briefly outline the
Federal Reserve’s performance with respect to
the level and the variability of inflation and
growth. To be sure, the strong economic perform-
ance over the past two decades has several pos-
sible explanations, but the practice of monetary
policy has likely contributed by helping to pre-
serve macroeconomic stability.
With respect to price stability, inflation in
the United States over the past decade or so has
clearly been lower and more stable than it was
earlier in our history. In fact, annual inflation in
the price index of personal consumption expen-
ditures excluding food and energy—core PCE—
averaged just over 2 percent from 1990 through
the end of 2003 and consistently remained within
a range—roughly 1 to 4 percent—that is relatively
narrow compared with historical experience. This
period contrasts sharply with the 14-year period
from 1965 through the end of 1979, when annual
core-PCE inflation averaged just over 5 percent
and fluctuated between 3 and 10 percent. The
recent experience of the United States with infla-
tion has been similar in some respects and dis-
similar in others to that of other countries. For
example, based on the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) meas-
ures of overall consumer price inflation, prices
rose at an annual average rate of about 3 percent
in the United States from 1990 through 2003, com-
pared with about 3 percent in the euro area and
in the United Kingdom and roughly 1 percent in
Japan.1 But, more important, the volatility of
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I
am pleased to address this conference com-
memorating the 25th anniversary of the his-
toric monetary policy changes implemented
in October 1979. In my prepared remarks, I would
like to focus on two issues with respect to safe-
guarding good monetary policy practice. First, 
I will discuss what constitutes good monetary
policy practice and review the Federal Reserve’s
record in satisfying its mandates in recent
decades. Then, I will speculate on how good
policy outcomes come about. In particular, I will
discuss the role of policy transparency, central
bank leadership, and alternative monetary policy
regimes in preserving effective monetary policy.
Of course, the usual caveat to my remarks applies:
I will express my own views, and you should
not interpret them as the position of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) or of the Board




When assessing what constitutes good mone-
tary policy practice, I prefer to focus not on theory
but on the reality of the Federal Reserve’s objec-
tives. In contrast to many other central banks,
the Federal Reserve has been assigned a “dual
mandate”—to pursue policies that both maintain
price stability and achieve maximum sustainable
1 Data are from the OECD Economic Outlook (No. 75, Excel spread-
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 inflation was lower in the United States than in
these other economies.
An equally important indicator of the success
of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy is private
expectations for future inflation. Measures of infla-
tion expectations obtained from financial asset
prices clearly indicate that market participants
expect that the Federal Reserve will maintain low
and stable inflation. For example, although the
difference between the yields on nominal inflation-
indexed and Treasury securities is an imperfect
measure that includes complicating factors, such
as inflation risk and liquidity premiums, the five-
year break-even inflation rate five years ahead
has averaged about 21/2 percent over the past five
years and has fluctuated in a narrow range of about
11/2 to 31/2 percent. Survey measures confirm that
inflation expectations over this period have been
subdued and well anchored. The University of
Michigan’s survey of 10-year inflation expecta-
tions has averaged less than 3 percent and has
stayed within a very narrow range over the past
five years. 
Assessing the outcomes with respect to the
Federal Reserve’s goal of maximum sustainable
output growth is inherently more difficult. Esti-
mates of the relevant measures, such as the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment
(NAIRU), which in recent years has been decreas-
ing according to some estimates, have very wide
confidence intervals. But we can point to some
evidence suggesting that the United States has
enjoyed, besides subdued and stable inflation,
some favorable developments with respect to
output and employment. Certainly, we can docu-
ment substantial gains in productivity in recent
decades in the United States. According to the
OECD, business sector labor productivity growth
in the United States averaged about 2 percent from
1990 through the end of 2003, compared with
about 11/2 percent in the euro area and in Japan
over the same period. And since the mid-1990s,
this gap has widened, with annual productivity
growth averaging about 21/2 percent since 1995
in the United States, compared with about 11/2
percent in Japan and just less than 1 percent in
the euro area over the same period.2
Another important measure of the success of
monetary policy is how well the FOMC has
responded to threats to our nation’s financial sta-
bility. This claim is surely hard to quantify. But
everyone would agree that, compared especially
with the deleterious effects of the Federal Reserve’s
policy response during the Great Depression, the
Fed has responded effectively to more-recent
crises so as to help minimize the impact of such
shocks on the greater economy. These episodes
include the stock market crash of October 1987,
the Asian financial crisis, and the collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management in the late 1990s.
Thanks in no small part to the flexibility of our
policy framework, which I will discuss in greater
detail in a few moments, the Federal Reserve
appropriately discharged its responsibility as
lender of last resort by providing ample liquidity
and ensuring confidence during these and other
troubling episodes, including the aftermath of
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
There is greater disagreement about how well
the Federal Reserve responded to the bursting in
recent years of the so-called bubble in technology
stocks. This topic is broad, but I would like to
note that, as many of my colleagues and I have
previously argued, prospectively addressing
perceived asset-price bubbles is a matter of such
great uncertainty that, even with the benefit of
hindsight, it is not clear that policy decisions in
the late 1990s, for example, should have been any
different. In any case, the recession that followed
the sharp decline in stock prices was shallow by
historical standards. 
HOW CAN WE SAFEGUARD
GOOD POLICY OUTCOMES?
I would now like to turn to issues related to
preserving, as best we can, a continuation of good
policy practice in the future. 
Central Bank Transparency
Consider first the important role of central
bank transparency. Transparency of central bank
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 decisionmaking is desirable, not only for economic
reasons but also because it is supportive of central
bank independence within a democratic society.
Because of the lagged effects of monetary policy
on output and prices, the time horizon of central
bankers is necessarily more distant than that of
other policymakers. Thus, the central bank needs
substantial insulation from political pressures to
execute policy: An independent monetary author-
ity is less tempted to make policy for the short
term, such as boosting output or refinancing
national budgets, at the expense of long-run objec-
tives. Of course, the goals of monetary policy
should be determined within the democratic
process, but the central bank should have discre-
tion to achieve those ends. In short, an appropriate
arrangement within democratic societies is for
central banks to have independence with respect
to the instruments, but not the goals, of monetary
policy, and transparency is an appropriate condi-
tion for that independence. 
Besides its inherent virtues in a democratic
society, transparency can enhance monetary
policy’s economic effectiveness by more closely
aligning financial market forces with central
bankers’ intentions. Like other central banks, the
Federal Reserve controls only a very short-term
interest rate—the overnight federal funds rate.
However, theory and empirical evidence suggest
that longer-term interest rates and conditions in
other financial markets, which reflect expectations
for short-term rates, matter most for monetary
policy transmission to the economy. If the mone-
tary authority is transparent about the rationale
and the stance of policy as well as its perception
of the economic outlook, then investors can
improve their expectations of future short rates.3
The path that monetary policy will follow in
the future is uncertain even to policymakers
because that trajectory will depend on incoming
news about the economy and the implications of
that news for the economic outlook. But announc-
ing policy decisions in a timely manner and
explaining those decisions fully allows market
participants to better anticipate the response of
policy to unexpected developments and to speed
needed financial adjustments.
Central Bank Leadership
Next, I consider the role of the individuals
entrusted with the responsibility for making policy
decisions. Although monetary policy frameworks
have a potentially great influence on macroecon-
omic outcomes, we should not forget that the
individuals who serve in central banks themselves
have a crucial role in preserving policy outcomes.
Even with a monetary policy regime that follows
best practices and shapes the decisionmaking
process, ultimately, individuals’ beliefs and per-
ceptions still matter for the actual policy taken. 
An interesting recent study of the history of
the Federal Reserve by Christina Romer and David
Romer finds a very strong link between the skill
and knowledge of the FOMC, particularly the
Chairman, and macroeconomic outcomes.4 For
example, with little reference to transformations
in the disclosure policy and the independence of
the Federal Reserve over the years, they ascribe the
policy successes of two periods—the 1950s and
the 1980s and 1990s—to a conviction of Federal
Reserve Chairmen regarding the high costs of infla-
tion and their tempered views about the sustain-
able levels of output and employment. In contrast,
they attribute the deflationary and counterproduc-
tive policies of the 1930s to the erroneous belief
that monetary policy can do little to stimulate
output and that the economy can actually over-
heat at low levels of capacity utilization.
But there is one aspect of the process that
Romer and Romer do not emphasize enough—
the ability of central bankers in general, and
indeed members of the FOMC in particular, to
withstand political pressures. In addition, central
bankers should have a thorough and practical,
rather than a purely academic, understanding of
the economy and, given the Federal Reserve’s
objective to preserve financial stability, of finan-
cial markets and institutions.
The Committee’s institutional memory may
also matter in this context. Today, the FOMC is
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4 See Romer and Romer (2004, pp. 129-62).well versed in the monetary history of the 1970s
and 1980s, for example, and recognizes the great
efforts that previous members of the FOMC
undertook to achieve price stability. I trust that
future generations of policymakers will continue
to share that understanding and thus help to pre-
serve good policy outcomes.
Will Inflation Targets Preserve Good
Policy Practice?
Finally, I would like to touch on a topic that is
perhaps more controversial in the context of safe-
guarding good policy practice. Several academic
and professional economists, including distin-
guished colleagues of mine at this conference, have
eloquently advocated the adoption of explicit
numerical goals for central bank objectives, most
notably inflation targets. The adoption of numeri-
cal targets, it is argued, facilitates central bank
accountability and better anchors private expec-
tations about inflation and monetary policy and
thereby yields better macroeconomic outcomes. 
Quantifying central bank objectives has some
positive aspects and, certainly, vigorous advocates.
Nonetheless, I harbor significant reservations
about this approach regarding both its practical
implementation, in the specific context of the
Federal Reserve System, and its demonstrated
effectiveness based on inferences from the recent
experience of regimes around the world that have
specific numerical targets, particularly with
respect to inflation.
A basic, yet difficult, issue is the selection of
a particular price index to guide policy, even in the
case of a single goal such as inflation. Experience
tells us that economies and the composition of
productive enterprises change over time, and
therefore the appropriate index and inflation value
for the monetary authority would also need to
change to reflect technological and other advances.
In light of this inherent uncertainty associated
with the construction of a price index, one might
be concerned that choosing and rigidly adhering
to an inappropriate index could have negative
economic consequences that might outweigh
prospective benefits.
Also, we must consider the ramifications of
quantified goals in the context of our democracy.
That is, the quantification of objectives becomes
even more problematic for central banks, such as
the Federal Reserve, with multiple democratically
based mandates, some of which are notably less
disposed to quantification than others. For exam-
ple, considering our dual mandate from the
Congress, how do we measure maximum sus-
tainable employment? Indeed, as I mentioned
previously, estimates of the NAIRU and other
possible related measures that address the full-
employment objective, such as the output gap,
have uncomfortably wide confidence intervals
and are far more controversial than selecting a
target for a specific price index. 
Of course, the central bank could in principle
quantify only the inflation objective. However, I
fear that quantifying one goal and not the other
would present problems because the monetary
authority might inadvertently place more empha-
sis on the quantified goal at the expense of the
nonquantified objective. Doing so would seem
inappropriate. The ease of quantification should
not influence how the Federal Reserve pursues
its dual mandate.
In addition, I worry about the potential loss
of flexibility from the implementation of an infla-
tion target, as explicit numerical goals might
inhibit the central bank’s focus on output variation
or financial stability. I would argue that, besides
the episodes of financial turmoil in the late 1990s
mentioned earlier, supply shocks, such as large
increases in oil prices that simultaneously increase
the price level and decrease aggregate output, can
be problematic for inflation-targeting regimes. 
Of course, some variants of the approach—
so-called flexible inflation targeting, for instance—
can address the issues I just raised by stipulating
wide target ranges, by maintaining escape clauses
that allow inflation to diverge from the target, or
by aiming at average inflation over the business
cycle. But the credibility gains from inflation tar-
geting seem to me to be inversely related to its
flexibility. Simply, credibility is less likely to be
gained and expectations are less likely to be
anchored if the central bank frequently uses escape
clauses, widens the target bands, or pushes out
its time horizon. 
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must come from performance, and predeter-
mined frameworks do not seem to be a necessary
or a sufficient condition to safeguard desirable
policy outcomes. Observation of more-recent
Federal Reserve actions reveals the apparent
preferences of policymakers. In recent years, the
Federal Reserve has apparently leaned against
disinflation when core inflation has threatened
to fall much below 1 percent and, similarly,
against inflation when the core rate has threat-
ened to rise above 2 to 21/2 percent. The Federal
Reserve has demonstrated this strategy without
the formal adoption of a specific inflation target
or range for the FOMC.
Given the subdued and stable inflation wit-
nessed over the past 14 years, I have to ask:
What would be gained from a formal goal for
inflation? Can we draw compelling general
inferences from the recent experience of infla-
tion-targeting central banks? As a caveat regard-
ing this evidence, economists have very limited
data to work with, as the first recognizable infla-
tion-targeting regime appeared in New Zealand
in 1990. But to date, I would argue that the case
for inflation targeting has yet to be proven. 
Certainly, I would not deny that numerical
inflation targets have proven useful for several
countries in particular circumstances. One
example is the United Kingdom, where, in the
aftermath of “Black Wednesday” in October
1992, an inflation target helped provide a nomi-
nal anchor after sterling was removed from the
European exchange rate mechanism. I should
also add that the Bank of England has quite suc-
cessfully helped to achieve low and stable infla-
tion ever since. In addition, inflation targeting
can have demonstrable benefits in lower-income
countries that have experienced high and vari-
able inflation rates in the recent past. 
In several cases, quantified inflation target-
ing has served as a means of achieving the cen-
tral bank independence necessary to focus more
effectively on controlling inflation. That is, the
adoption of an inflation target is frequently part
of a broader program to increase the autonomy
and transparency of central bank practice. But
inflation targeting is not the only means by
which to achieve these ends. Again, the recent
experience in the United States that I have noted
is an object lesson in this regard. 
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence for
industrial countries available to date generally
appears insufficient to assess the success of the
inflation-targeting approach with confidence.
For example, it is unclear whether the announce-
ment of quantitative inflation targets lessens the
short-run trade-off between employment and
inflation and whether it helps anchor inflation
expectations. In addition, some research, control-
ling for other factors, fails to isolate the benefits
of an inflation target with respect to the level of
inflation or its volatility over time, and output does
not seem to fluctuate more stably around its poten-
tial for countries that have adopted numerical
targets.5 Future data may or may not produce com-
pelling evidence, but I maintain that the case
today for inflation targets in countries that already
enjoy low and stable inflation rates has certainly
not been proven.
With respect to both its practical implemen-
tation, particularly in the United States, and the
empirical evidence to date, I submit that the
adoption of a numerical inflation target does not
promise any obvious incremental benefits, at
least in countries that have already achieved rea-
sonable price stability. That said, a continuing
commitment to price stability is certainly impor-
tant, and the Federal Reserve has established a
solid record of such commitment.
CONCLUSION
Based on this brief review, I conclude that, at
least since the policy reform of October 1979, most
observers would agree that the Federal Reserve
has achieved generally good policy practice and
outcomes. In my assessment, good policy practice
cannot be safeguarded with certainty using a single
rule or framework, such as inflation targeting.
Good outcomes ultimately depend on flexible
execution of an evolving strategy and policy-
makers with an unwavering commitment to low
and stable inflation as the foundation for maxi-
mum sustainable growth. 
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want to start with two matters that are rele-
vant to the main theme of this conference
but slightly extraneous to the particular
topic that I have been allotted.
First, you, here in the United States, were not
the only country considering a change in mone-
tary control methods in the early autumn of 1979;
we in the United Kingdom were also reviewing
the pros and cons of various forms of monetary
control at exactly the same time. Indeed, when
John Fforde, the Bank’s Executive Director in
charge of monetary policy, visited the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York at the end of October
to find out about your new techniques, he reported
back comparing your new mechanism to those
already under consideration in the Bank. The gist
of what was then being discussed here is available
in the Green Paper on Monetary Control, published
in March 1980 by the Bank and the Treasury
(H.M. Treasury and Bank of England, 1980).1
I do not think that there was much difference
in analysis between us. Fforde noted that your
new nonborrowed reserve target mechanism led to
a quasi-automatic response in short-term interest
rates to undesired movements in the target aggre-
gate, exactly like several of the possible responses
that we were considering. But he noted that the
cutting edge of this American version of our own
considered variant was the enforced use of the
discount window and exploitation of the associ-
ated non-price deterrent to such use, which in turn
caused the banks to bid up for federal funds. This
then enabled the authorities to say that they were
restraining the supply of reserves while the market
was setting the rate of interest. Fforde describes
this as an appearance of market-generated interest
rates, with the role of the authorities being to
some degree disguised. The only real point of
1 The internal Bank papers relating to these discussions will
become available in 2009.
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national capital flows could possibly cause
dynamic instability in such a system, a greater
worry to us than to you.
The differences between us were not analyti-
cal, but lay in the political context. You then
still had the Carter presidency and a Congress
whose willingness to accede to interest rate hikes
that would be strong enough to combat deeply
entrenched inflationary expectations was ques-
tionable. By then we had Mrs. Thatcher as Prime
Minister, and Ministers and political advisors to
whom monetarism was a matter of faith. We, in the
United Kingdom, were in the unusual situation
of having a government that was far more hawkish
than its central bank on the need for deflation.
In this context, our concern in the Bank was
not so much that policy would not be made suffi-
ciently tight to bring down inflation, but that the
means of doing so would bring with it unnecessary
collateral damage. We feared that monetarist
Ministers and political advisors might believe
that monetary base control was an alternative to
interest rate changes, not just a mechanism for
bringing them about. We also feared that Ministers
would place an exaggerated faith in the closeness
of the various linkages, between the monetary base
and the target broader aggregate and between the
chosen monetary aggregate and nominal incomes.
If I may say so, this latter concern had formed the
core of Goodhart’s law2 propounded just a few
years earlier. All this is set out in my Economic
Journal article of 1989, “The Conduct of Monetary
Policy.” But the point of this first extraneous
comment is that what distinguished the Fed from
the Bank of England in 1979 was the political
context, not any difference in economic theory
or analysis.
My second extraneous comment arises from
a reaction to the Faust and Henderson paper enti-
tled “Is Inflation Targeting Best Practice Monetary
Policy?” and particularly Ben Friedman’s (2004)
discussant commentary on that, in the July/August
2004 issue of your Review that covered your pre-
ceding conference on inflation targeting. Here Ben
Friedman excoriates (inflation targeting) central
banks in general, and the Bank of England in
particular, for focusing solely, or at least exces-
sively, on inflation in their comments and reports.
In this respect he fails to mention the letters that
the Bank is required by law to send openly, and
to be published, to the Chancellor should infla-
tion ever deviate by more than 1 percent from its
target. Surely the expectation would be that any
severe supply shock, oil prices or whatever, would
cause such a deviation in the short run. The letter
to the Chancellor would give the Bank the perfect
platform to explain how it would trade off output
deviations against inflation deviations, and the
Chancellor could write back if he did not like the
proposed trade-off.
When the British Monetary Policy Committee
(MPC) first met, we expected, on the basis of past
evidence of inflation variability, to have to write
such a letter about once per year. However, none
have been written in the seven years of the MPC’s
existence. In some ways this is a pity because it
obscures how one key feature of the system is
supposed to work. It is a consequence of the fact
that the volatility of inflation has collapsed in the
past decade, since we turned to inflation targeting
in 1993. Figure 1 is taken from Benati (2004). But
we have not achieved greater stability of inflation
by sacrificing output volatility. That, too, has
declined, though much less dramatically (Figure 2).
And in this context, not surprisingly perhaps,
interest rates have also been less variable.
Such an overall marked reduction in volatility
was neither expected in advance, nor, after the
event, fully understood, though surely better
policies played some role. Meanwhile, the Bank
(and the MPC) is being criticized on statistical
grounds for continuing to show a wider fan chart,
especially for inflation, than recent history would
suggest (Wallis, 2004). Given that we do not really
understand the reason for that collapse in volatil-
ity, I have to confess that, if I were still on the MPC,
I would reckon that tightening up the fan chart
width in the light of past stability would be the
harbinger of future bad luck.
Another concern is whether the private sector
might unduly internalize such remarkable stabil-
ity, and—along the lines of the Modigliani-Miller
2 Goodhart’s law is “that any observed statistical regularity will tend
to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes”
(Goodhart, 1984, p. 96).
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undo it. 
In his excellent book Risk, John Adams (1994),
a social scientist at University College in London,
analyzes the ways in which humans react to risk.
In the most remarkable, and in some ways shock-
ing, part of his work, Adam records that most
road safety legislation, car seat belts, for example,
has actually led to an overall increase in fatal
traffic accidents. While his results are clearly
disturbing, I have not heard that they have been
controverted.
What is going on then? The key feature is that
most road safety regulation makes the environ-
ment safer for the driver, and the inhabitants of
the car, who are often family or friends. Appreci-
ating that they are safer, it shifts the return, the
trade-off, between safety and speed in favor of
speed. Of course, the driver wants more of both,
so the number of fatalities in cars does tend to go
down, but only at the expense of more fatalities
for those outside the better-protected cars—that
is, pedestrians and bicyclists.
It is entirely in the spirit of John Adams’s work
to argue that one could reduce traffic accidents
more certainly if, instead of an air bag, it was
mandatory that each car had a six-inch spike
pointing up at the driver from his steering wheel,
preferably painted red and dripping fake red gore.
Do you seriously doubt that this requirement, I
hesitate to call it reform, would sharply reduce
speeds, shift people back to public transport and
bicycles, and overall greatly reduce traffic-related
fatalities? Yet, of course, it will not happen. It is
not supposed to be part of the authorities’ remit
to make life more, not less, dangerous for some,
often politically powerful, sectors of society.
Perhaps, notably in the field of financial regula-
tion, sometimes this is what the authorities should
be doing!
Be that as it may, let me try to apply such
insights to monetary policy. If inflation, and with
it interest rates, is now likely to be more stable,
this enables the private sector to assume more
risk, in the shape of greater leverage and driving-
down risk premia in asset markets. If the author-
ities make the conjuncture safer, the private sector
is bound to undo some part of that to restore their
desired risk/return equilibrium. It is this kind of
analysis that lies behind the argument that greater
stability of goods and services prices will generate
potentially greater instability in asset prices, and
whether—and, if so, how—a central bank could
and should deal with the latter.
But this latter general topic is “old hat,” having
been thoroughly chewed over in innumerable
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 conferences and articles, and I doubt if such
Modigliani/Miller undoing of stability is a serious
danger to monetary policymakers. Equally, I would
tend to dismiss two other bug-bears: (i) that the
central bank might lose control of its power to
set interest rates, perhaps for some technological
reason, e-money and all that (see the discussion,
edited by Adam Posen, in International Finance,
2000); or (ii) that deflationary pressures could
cause nominal interest rates to reach the zero-
bound, and then the central bank might become
powerless. (See the papers given at the Bank for
International Settlements conference on deflation
in June 2004.)
One issue that does concern me is that the
entirely domestic focus on inflation targeting,
and the more nuanced version of that conducted
here and by the European Central Bank, could
lead to a combination of internal price stability
and external exchange rate instability. Since few
would want to sacrifice domestic price stability
in pursuit of greater exchange rate stability, this
raises the question of whether the monetary author-
ities might summon up slightly more courage to
intervene in foreign exchange markets on those
occasions when they felt convinced that markets
had overshot and gotten it wrong.
A major problem here is that our understand-
ing of the determinants and dynamics of the for-
eign exchange market, at least in the short and
medium run, is so lacking that it takes a brave
central bank official to call an overshoot. Indeed,
one of the few stylized facts in this field, that
exchange rates would appreciate in response to
an increase in domestic interest rates, has been
called into question in recent years. Insofar as
international capital flows have become increas-
ingly equity, rather than debt, related, a rise in
interest rates could reduce rather than encourage
inward capital flows.
A decade or so ago, one of the main transmis-
sion channels for monetary policy, at least for
small- and medium-sized open economies, was
external. That is to say, a rise in interest rates
was expected to appreciate the currency, and the
pass-through of lower import prices would help
to lower inflation. Nowadays both of those influ-
ences, the effect of interest rates on exchange rates
and of exchange rates on domestic prices, have
been perceived as more muted and, even in the
case of interest rates, ambiguous of sign.
In place of external effects, the continuing
build-up of personal assets and debts is, perhaps,
making personal expenditures more sensitive to
monetary policy. My point, however, is not that
the transmission mechanism might be changing,
but rather that there is, perhaps, rather greater
uncertainty about the coefficients in these relation-
ships. There is certainly a continuing, maybe
enhanced, danger of getting the policy response
wrong because of uncertainty about the transmis-
sion mechanism.
Faced with such uncertainty, central banks
will surely be even keener than ever on gradual-
ism, whatever the theories of robust policy
responses and the need for learning may advocate.
Those runners who lead the earlier stages of long-
distance races are very exposed. Perhaps the
safest place for central banks is slightly off the
pace, behind, but close to, the curve.
The past 15 years or so have been a period of
enormous success for central banks. Some of
that success may have been fortuitous, with a
relatively benign political and economic conjunc-
ture, with some other part due to a once-for-all
effect of declining inflation and inflation volatil-
ity, combined with falling, and quite stable, inter-
est rates. One must expect conditions to become
more difficult over the next 15 years.
If so, there may well be increasing political
attacks on central bank independence, the more
so where real economic growth becomes slow or
stuttering. The analytical concept of the vertical
Phillips curve is not one that lends itself easily
to the public imagination. The idea that an
increase in interest rates to safeguard price sta-
bility may be the best way to maintain long-run
growth is not self-evidently obvious, especially
to indebted business men.
Moreover, there is often a problem with demo-
cratic legitimacy, perhaps especially so in the
Eurozone, and least in the United Kingdom. The
main dangers that I see are political rather than
economic. Combine slower growth with perhaps
a mistake in judging the transmission mechanism,
and it is easy to see how a populist politician
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pendence. I have elsewhere (e.g., Goodhart, 2002;
Goodhart and Meade, 2004) tried to draw an
analogy between the independence of the legal
system and the operational independence of
central banks. The latter, however, is more recent,
less entrenched in our social and political mores,
and far more fragile than that of the legal system.
It could still all go wrong; if it did so, I would
expect the chief weakness to be political fragility.
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can’t help recognizing an emotional note in
my reaction to this conference. Yesterday,
we enjoyed three superb scholarly papers.
Allan Meltzer’s paper left me depressed, and
the Lindsey, Orphanides, Rasche paper left me
elated. Marvin Goodfriend’s paper left me with
hope for the future. 
But now I’ll try to be a dispassionate social
scientist. This panel inevitably overlaps somewhat
the previous one on what we have learned since
October 1979. In no small part, what we have
learned since October 1979 starts with what we
learned from the Great Inflation and how it was
brought to an end. Going forward, we need to
incorporate in policy practice both sound theory
and lessons from history. 
I will make five major points, none of which
is new but all of which deserve attention in the
context of this conference. First, good science is
extraordinarily important. Second, market confi-
dence in the central bank is essential for good
monetary policy. Third, stability of the real
economy requires price stability. Fourth, central
bankers have an obligation to communicate
clearly with the general public. Fifth, we should
not underestimate the role of leadership.
GOOD SCIENCE
The problems of the 1960s and 1970s were
partly—not totally, but partly—the consequence
of bad economics. Allan Meltzer has discussed
those issues, and I do not need to repeat his argu-
ment here. 
I note especially that Chairman Martin’s dis-
missal of economics and economists does not
make for happy reading today. I hope that we
never again see Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) members with that attitude. Policymakers
need not be professional economists, but they
must be able to understand what economists bring
to the table.
How do we safeguard a high level of expertise
in the FOMC of the future? There is no way to
ensure that the appointment process will always
put the right people on the FOMC. But I think we
can help to guard against appointment errors by
working with Reserve Bank directors, who choose
Reserve Bank presidents, with Congress, and
with opinion leaders in general. Those of us in
leadership positions today, and everyone else
with monetary policy expertise, need to spend
time in helping to instill in the general public a
deeper understanding of monetary policy respon-
sibilities. We need to discuss what characteristics
are necessary for policymakers to be successful. I
hope that we never again have appointments
yielding the results of the 1930s, 1960s, and 1970s.
The largest gap in macroeconomics is the
weak understanding of the relationship between
real and nominal variables. In our models, we
employ a Phillips-curve type of relationship to
model inflation, or changes in the rate of inflation.
In our models, a departure of the actual rate of
inflation from the expected rate depends on a
current and expected future real gap measure of
some sort. I simply distrust this model, on both
theoretical and empirical grounds. Empirically, I
don’t think it works very well, and theoretically
it ought not to work very well. 
I’d love to hear Chairman Greenspan offer a
systematic exposition of his enormous success
in forecasting inflation pressures. My sense of
what I do, which I think is not dissimilar to what
most FOMC members do, is attempt to intuit
future inflation pressures from current observed
pressures as they show up in both price changes
and resource pressures, or real gaps, in individual
markets. The approach is not totally without
theory; for example, wage changes are evaluated
in light of expected productivity trends. I attempt
to sort out temporary from more lasting wage and
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 price changes and attempt informally to construct
an appropriately weighted average of disparate
experience in various sectors.  I look closely at
data on inflation expectations, but treat such data
carefully because longer-run expectations are
really a vote of confidence on the Fed and not an
independent reading on inflation. 
I am extremely uncomfortable with this
approach and believe that it is an invitation to
future mistakes. I don’t know what better to do.
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
A standard feature of monetary analysis in
recent years is that market confidence in the
central bank is tremendously important. Retain-
ing confidence requires, above all, successful out-
comes. There is no adequate substitute for good
results. The market does not require perfection—
people do understand in broad outline what the
central bank can and cannot do. People under-
stand that some small mistakes are inevitable.
Still, the market will surely lose confidence from
mistakes occurring year after year after year. 
Once confidence is gone, restoring it is incred-
ibly costly. That is one of the prime lessons of U.S.
experience in the late 1970s and early 1980s and
experience around the world. To restore confi-
dence, it is necessary to achieve, or least make
progress on, policy objectives of price stability
and full employment. 
Making progress on policy objectives is far
more important than hitting an intermediate target
such as a steady, moderate rate of money growth.
To the noneconomist, intermediate targets are
highly technical in character. I am not an engineer,
for example, and really don’t care what engineers
say about the strength of steel when bridges fall
down. Similarly, the noneconomist really doesn’t
care about the rate of money growth. If it works,
fine, but stable money growth is not a substitute
for price stability. Of course, an intermediate target
may be of transitional importance in restoring
confidence, as the 1979-82 experience shows.
Restoring confidence may require—indeed, I
suspect in most cases does require—bearing a lot
of pain to demonstrate that a central bank is seri-
ous about meeting its responsibilities. The reces-
sion of 1981-82 is such an event. The market wants
to see the central bank is able to bear pain, and
the reasoning is simple. If you cannot withstand
a lot of pain, why should anyone believe you are
serious given all the pressures to change course?
Technical explanations can always be offered to
explain a change in policy direction, but if it
appears that technical mumbo jumbo is an excuse
for not completing the job, then confidence will
not be restored. Thus, a change in policy direction
will require a fairly understandable explanation
once a fair amount of pain has been endured. 
The logic of pain seems inescapable. Inflation
cannot fall permanently unless inflation expecta-
tions come down. Expectations will not come
down in the absence of confidence that the central
bank will keep inflation down in the future. Confi-
dence in the central bank will not be obtained
unless the market becomes convinced that the
central bank, and the political system more gen-
erally, has the institutional strength to maintain
low inflation. The real test of institutional strength
is capacity to bear pain.
The rational expectations argument of costless
disinflation through restoration of credibility never
appealed to me. In 1979, given what the Fed had
said and done over the preceding 15 years, it
would have been irrational to have granted the
Fed instant credibility. 
PRICE STABILITY AND REAL
ECONOMIC STABILITY
My third point is that maintaining price sta-
bility is extraordinarily important for stability of
the real economy. The idea that we can trade off
employment stability against inflation stability is
flawed. I do not want to deny that there may be
some trade-off around the edges, but the key regu-
larity is that instability of inflation and real growth
are positively correlated. Tolerance of higher infla-
tion is not a recipe for creating higher employ-
ment or improved employment stability, but just
the reverse. The reason is that inflation instabil-
ity creates more instability in inflation expecta-
tions and wider dispersion in the expected rate
of inflation. 
Greater variability and dispersion of inflation
expectations increases the magnitude of expecta-
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in the real economy. Moreover, an increase in
inflation tends to reduce the market’s confidence
in the central bank, which, in turn, makes it more
difficult for the central bank to adjust its policy
to help stabilize the real economy. This point was
demonstrated dramatically in the 1980-82 period.
Given weak market confidence in the Federal
Reserve’s willingness to control inflation, the Fed
was not able to switch gears toward a less restric-
tive policy as employment weakened in the 1981
recession. The central bank could not switch gears
because doing so ran the risk of undoing tentative
progress in restoring the market’s confidence in
the central bank. 
The arguments I have just offered flow from
sound economics—the observed positive corre-
lation between inflation instability and employ-
ment instability is what we ought to expect.
COMMUNICATION
Allan Meltzer discussed the intellectual
environment that made the Great Inflation possi-
ble. By the 1960s, traditional central bank concern
over inflation had come to be regarded as old
fashioned and the new economics promise of an
optimal trade-off of modest inflation to buy lower
unemployment had won many converts. Although
the Federal Reserve, especially the Board of
Governors, included converts, the Fed also
included leaders who shared traditional concerns
about inflation. My memory of this period, which
I have not tried to research for accuracy, is that
traditional concerns were not stated forcefully
by articulate defenders of price stability within
the Fed. 
Central bankers can influence public debates,
if they try. One of the lessons I draw from the
Great Inflation is that those of us in leadership
positions in the Federal Reserve have an obliga-
tion to communicate actively. If we do not, by
default we leave the debate to others. I think that
academics are important to public debates prima-
rily through the longer-run force of their scholarly
contributions. These are all that really matter in
the long run; in the short run, some academics
command public attention, but not very many
and not much attention in the scheme of things.
Press attention is concentrated on politicians,
office-holders in general, and business leaders
who control large resources. Federal Reserve
office-holders immediately attract press attention,
by nature of their positions. As a Reserve Bank
president, I have an opportunity to reach an audi-
ence far larger than I ever had as a professor at
Brown University.
The communications environment is quite
different today from the early 1980s, when the
Fed released relatively little information. In the
interest of full disclosure, I was one of the skeptics
when the Fed abandoned reserve targeting in the
late summer of 1982. My fear was that the Fed
would embark once again on a policy that would
permit inflation to rise. As a monetary economist,
perhaps I knew too much; I found the Fed’s expla-
nation for switching from nonborrowed-reserves
to borrowed-reserves control in 1982 an example
of the technical mumbo jumbo I referred to earlier.
But the market bought the argument, and the fact
that monetarists such as I were suspicious was
irrelevant. I was wrong, and I am certainly happy
that I was wrong.
Still, the current environment of much greater
Fed openness has probably raised the standard
of what will be required in debates in the future.
If the Fed makes major mistakes and must again
embark on a campaign to restore credibility, I
suspect that it will have to pursue a more open
dialog with the public. 
In any event, safeguarding good policy prac-
tice from political pressures will require ongoing
communication with Congress, market profes-
sionals, leading citizens, and the general public.
Good monetary policy will be easier, and more
effective, with widespread understanding of what
constitutes good policy. That to me is one of the
clear lessons of the Great Inflation.
LEADERSHIP
My last point concerns the role of leadership.
This conference is a celebration of Paul Volcker’s
leadership. 
Central bank leadership requires at times a
willingness to push hard enough to get the job
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The central bank does not want to get itself fired
through changes in law or appointments that
undermine the bank’s authority. Pushing hard
enough but not too hard is obviously a dicey act
at times, requiring political judgment and acumen,
but it is nevertheless one that central bank leader-
ship must be able to pull off successfully. 
I appreciate, at a much deeper level today
than I did at the time, the extent of Paul Volcker’s
achievements in the 1979-82 period. Saying that
is not meant to imply a negative comment about
his achievements in later years. But certainly
1979-82 was a critical period in U.S. monetary
history. I know that Paul Volcker did not do the
job alone—support from President Reagan was
critical. That said, there was no guarantee that
President Carter would appoint Paul Volcker.
Volcker was a logical, but not inevitable, appoint-
ment. President Carter could instead have
appointed a Chairman who would have continued
the policy of drift. The inflation rate would have
continued to rise, and the pain of unwinding the
inflation would have been greater. 
The Great Inflation is understandable, but
was not unavoidable. Stronger leadership by
Chairman Martin would have cut short the early
development of inflation. Chairman Burns could
have stopped it. The intellectual and political
environment of the 1960s and 1970s certainly had
a lot to do with making the Great Inflation possi-
ble. Still, the Great Inflation was not inevitable. 
Leadership really does matter.
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